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INGESTED COPY — not WHO, and not live. This page is rendered by folio-assistant from its own catalogue of WHO IRIS, modelled by reference: 235 nodes of a 273,559-item 361.55 GiB repository, of which 12 items are held here. The WHO logo is deliberately omitted, and the rendered covers are withheld from display for the same reason — they carry the emblem printed on the publications.
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iris. Institutional Repository
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Documentation•IRIS CDN Exporter: signing options

IRIS CDN Exporter: signing options

How to sign an IRIS CDN release: a detached JWS (option A) or a W3C Data Integrity proof (option C). Option A is the one used, as a detached JWS (ES256) on each library item plus one over the release; what is signed and how is in iris-cdn-signing. This page is the comparison behind that choice. The signing key is subordinate to WHO's signing DID:

did:web:raw.githubusercontent.com:WorldHealthOrganization:tng-participants-prod:main:WHO:signing:DID (did.json)

What WHO's DID document contains (read 2026-10-30)

FieldValue
@contexthttps://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1, https://w3id.org/security/suites/jws-2020/v1
verificationMethod[0].typeJsonWebKey2020
keypublicKeyJwk, kty: EC, crv: P-256, which means ES256
controlleritself
assertionMethodnot present. Only verificationMethod is listed

Three things follow:

  1. The curve is P-256, not Ed25519. A key that sits under WHO's should use the same curve, so one verifier library and one algorithm (ES256, RFC 7518) cover the whole chain.
  2. WHO's document uses the JWS-2020 vocabulary. JsonWebKey2020 and its context are a W3C Credentials Community Group report, not a W3C Recommendation. It is published, though, and WHO already uses it. Following the parent's form is the least surprising choice. The W3C Recommendation equivalent is JsonWebKey from Controlled Identifiers 1.0.
  3. No assertionMethod. A verifier checking WHO's key directly can only use verificationMethod. Our own DID document should still list assertionMethod, because that is how DID Core says a key may sign statements.

Option A: detached JWS over the BagIt tag manifest

The signed bytes are tagmanifest-sha256.txt (RFC 8493). The signature is a compact JWS with a detached payload (RFC 7515 Appendix F), alg: ES256 (RFC 7518), and kid set to a DID URL.

StandardsRFC 7515, RFC 7518, RFC 8493. All are IETF standards
Fits WHO's DIDYes. JWS with a P-256 JWK is exactly what JsonWebKey2020 / jws-2020 describes
Fits WHO SMART Trust / GDHCN toolingYes. That ecosystem signs with ES256 over JOSE and COSE
What it coversEvery byte of the release, through the tag manifest and the payload manifest
ChurnOne signature per release and one per changed item. An unchanged night has an identical tag manifest, so it gets no new signature. There is no timestamp in the header
ToolingEverywhere: WebCrypto, jose, openssl, every language
Verifier effortFetch the DID document, run one ES256 verify, then sha256sum -c
WeaknessIt signs files, not meaning. Re-serializing the graph, for example re-ordering N-Quads, breaks the digest even when the data is the same. Sorted output prevents that on our side

Option C: W3C Data Integrity proof

The signed object is a JSON document, for example a manifest written as a Verifiable Credential, carrying an embedded proof with type: DataIntegrityProof.

StandardsVC Data Integrity 1.0 and Data Integrity ECDSA Cryptosuites 1.0. Both are W3C Recommendations of 15 May 2025
Cryptosuiteecdsa-jcs-2019 (JSON canonicalization) or ecdsa-rdfc-2019 (RDF canonicalization). P-256 is supported
Fits WHO's DIDNot directly. The ECDSA cryptosuites define only Multikey verification methods. WHO's key is a JsonWebKey2020, so a Data Integrity verifier following the Recommendation would not accept WHO's key as it is published. WHO would need to add a Multikey form of the key
What it coversA JSON document. The BagIt manifest is plain text, so it would have to be wrapped in a JSON or VC envelope, and no published schema exists for a file manifest as a VC. One would have to be invented, which conflicts with "no new schemas without approval"
The RDF optionecdsa-rdfc-2019 can sign the graph itself, so the signature survives re-serialization. RDF canonicalization (RDFC-1.0) of ~12 million quads is heavy, and cost grows with blank nodes. We have none, which helps
ChurnOne proof per release. created is optional, so it can be left out to keep bytes stable
ToolingFewer libraries, mostly the Digital Bazaar stack. Portals such as Moodle or an intranet are unlikely to have a verifier

Comparison

A: JWSC: Data Integrity
Works with WHO's key as published todayYesNo (needs Multikey)
Signs the whole release, PDFs includedYesOnly through an invented wrapper
New schema neededNoYes, a manifest-as-VC
Survives graph re-serializationNo (prevented by sorted output)Yes, with rdfc
Verifier toolingUniversalSpecialist
ChurnNone on unchanged nightsNone if created is omitted

Why A

A works with WHO's key as published, x5c fits JWS, and it needs no new schema. C's real advantage, a signature over meaning rather than bytes, can be added later for the graph alone: a second, optional ecdsa-rdfc-2019 proof over the spine and partitions, once WHO publishes a Multikey form of its key.

Making our key subordinate to WHO's

DID Core has no single "subordinate key" mechanism. The exporter's key carries an x5c certificate chain (RFC 7517 §4.7) ending at a certificate issued by WHO's signing key, so no edit to WHO's DID document is needed. The alternatives considered were:

WayHowWhat WHO must doStrength
S1. A key inside WHO's DIDAdd our P-256 key to WHO's did.json as #iris-cdn. Releases are signed with kid = <WHO DID>#iris-cdnEdit tng-participants-prodStrongest and simplest to verify. It is WHO's own document
S2. Our own DID, controlled by WHOPublish did:web:<cdn-domain> with controller: <WHO DID>, and have WHO's document point back to it, for example in alsoKnownAs or a service entryAdd one back-referenceA controller claim on its own is one-directional and proves nothing. The back-reference is what makes it checkable
S3. An endorsement signed by WHOOur DID document holds our key. WHO's key signs, once, a JWS over our key's JWK thumbprint (RFC 7638) and our DID, published beside our did.jsonSign once with WHO's key. No edit to WHO's repoVerifiable with the same JWS tooling. It needs re-signing when our key rotates

The verifier's chain is: the JWS, then our key from our DID document, then its x5c certificates, ending at WHO's P-256 key, which the verifier is given as its trust anchor. GDHCN trust lists are not assumed anywhere in that chain.